Nominal Price Shocks in Monopolistically Competitive Markets: An Experimental Analysis by Douglas D. Davis & Korenok Oleg
1 
 
Nominal Price Shocks in Monopolistically Competitive 
Markets: An Experimental Analysis  
 
Douglas Davis and Oleg Korenok
12 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University 




We report a market experiment that examines the capacity of price and information 
frictions to explain real responses to nominal price shocks.  As predicted by the standard 
dynamic adjustment models, we find that both price and information frictions impede the 
response to a nominal shock.  We also find, however, that the observed adjustment delays far 
exceed predicted levels.  Results of a pair of subsequent treatments indicate that a combination of 
announcing the shock privately to all sellers (rather than publicly) and a failure of many sellers to 
best respond to their expectations explains the observed adjustment inertia.  
 
Keywords:  market experiments, price rigidities, information rigidities, bounded rationality 
 
JEL classification: C9, E42, E47 
   
                                                 
1 Address for correspondence: Department of Economics, 301 W. Main Street, P.O. Box 84400, Virginia 
Commonwealth University, Richmond VA 23284-4000 E-mail: okorenok@vcu.edu.  Experimental instructions and 
an appendix and the experimental data are available at www.people.vcu.edu/~dddavis. 
 
2 We thank without implicating editor Robert King, associate editor Klaus Adam and two anonymous referees for 
their helpful comments, as well as Asen Ivanov, Robert Reilly, participants of the LeeX International Conference on 
Theoretical and Experimental Macroeconomics, and the NBER Monetary Economics meeting.  Financial assistance 
from the National Science Foundation (SES 1034527) and the Virginia Commonwealth University Faculty Summer 
Research Grants Program is gratefully acknowledged.  Thanks also to Matthew Nuckols for programming 





Explaining  the  temporary  real  effects  of  nominal  disturbances  engineered  by  central 
banks is an important issue in macroeconomics. In a frictionless economy populated by perfectly 
rational  firms,  nominal  disturbances  have  no  effect  on  the  quantity  produced  because  firms 
immediately and fully accommodate by adjusting their prices. 
To explain real effects, researchers typically introduce frictions. The most popular model 
introduces a pricing friction by assuming that only a fraction of firms can reset prices at any 
point in time (e.g., Fischer 1977, Taylor 1980, Calvo, 1983).  Other firms, bound by contracts, 
maintain previous prices and adjust passively their production quantities.  An alternative model 
by Mankiw and Reis (2002) introduces an informational rigidity by assuming that only a fraction 
of firms update information regarding underlying market conditions at any given time.  Other 
firms adjust production quantities absent information regarding nominal changes. 
This paper reports a laboratory experiment conducted to evaluate the relative capacity of 
these alternative theories to explain a delayed adjustment of prices following a nominal shock.  
Perhaps more than any area in economics, the notion that experiments (other than occasional 
„natural‟ experiments) can provide useful data has been met with skepticism in macroeconomics. 
The economy-wide scale of macroeconomic phenomenon undoubtedly calls into question the 
notion of constructing pertinent laboratory environments.
3   However, the increased focus in 
macroeconomics on models in which agents optimize in a specific institutional framework raises 
questions about how individuals actually behave in such relatively narrow circumstances and for 
this reason, creates a natural context for behavioral investigation with laboratory tools.
4 
The role of frictions in explaining real responses to nominal shock is an important case in 
point.  The debate over the real effects of nominal shocks centers on seller responses to different 
sorts  of  frictions  in  a  monopolistically  competitive  price -setting  environment.    Literally 
thousands of laboratory experiments have been conducted to examine variations in institutional 
features on market performance using paid human subjects.
5  Thus, the use of experimental 
                                                 
3 Admirable attempts, however, have recently been made to construct large scale laboratory economies.  For 
example Noussair, Plott and Reizeman (2007) report an experiment conducted in a design that included sessions of 
50 participants who interacted in 21 markets. 
4 Duffy (2008) comprehensively reviews the fairly large and growing macroeconomic experimental literature 
developed over the last twenty years.  He also develops more fully a justification for the use of laboratory tools to 
evaluate issues in macroeconomics.  Macroeconomic experiments, he argues, need not be elephantine, rather they 
merely need to address questions that pertain to macroeconomic models.   
5  We note that the subject pool for these experiments typically consists of undergraduate students.  (This is true of 
the present study as well.) The effects of using alternative subject pools have been examined at some length. In 3 
 
methods to examine the predicted effects of price and informational rigidities in a price-setting 
context is a natural extension. 
Given both the prominence of price and information frictions as explanations for real 
effects following from nominal shocks and the usefulness of laboratory methods for evaluating 
the effects of such frictions, we find surprising the relative lack of attention to this question 
among  experimentalists.    The  only  directly  related  study  of  which  we  are  aware  is  Wilson 
(1998), who investigates the effect of nominal shocks on monopolists.  In his experiment, a price 
setting monopolist optimizes in light of a fixed (menu adjustment) cost.  After a nominal shock, 
the monopolist can either maintain a previous period price or incur the fixed costs and change 
her price. Wilson‟s finds that price stickiness in the form of menu costs delays price adjustment.
6 
Our interest in the monopolistically competitive structure routinely used in monetary t heory, as 
well as in the effects of both „sticky prices‟ and „sticky information‟, prompts us to consider a 
structure that deviates considerably from the Wilson monopoly design.  Our design differs most 
distinctly from that examined by Wilson in two respects.  First, we examine performance in a 
relatively  thick  six  seller  differentiated-product  environment.  Second,  we  implement  price 
stickiness  as  staggered  contracts  rather  than  as  menu  adjustment  costs.  This  allows  us  to 
introduce comparable price and information frictions.  (With staggered contracts a comparable 
degree of information stickiness can then be introduced as staggered information updates.) 
By way of preview, we find that both price and information frictions slow sellers‟ initial 
responses  to  a  nominal  shock.    Comparing  across  treatments,  the  price  path  in  the  „sticky 
information‟  treatment  tends  to  track  below  price  paths  in  the  other  treatments.  Most 
prominently, however, the observed adjustment process in both treatments is far slower than 
predicted.  In fact, we observe long adjustment lags even in a frictionless baseline treatment, 
                                                                                                                                                             
market games of the type examined here, very little suggests that undergraduate students behave differently than 
agents with experience in pertinent natural contexts.  Traders and college undergraduates, for example, exhibit the 
same tendency toward speculative pricing bubbles in laboratory asset market experiments (King et al. 1993, Lei et 
al. 2001).  Similarly, the use of contractors in common value auctions does not eliminate the winner‟s curse (Dyer et 
al. 1989), and the average price/quality choices of corporate auditors in a sealed offer bidding game do not differ 
from those of college undergraduates (DeJong et al., 1988),  Although subject pool effects have been identified in 
laboratory economics experiments,  those effects tend to involve differences in economic fundamentals, such as 
generosity, risk preferences or discount rates rather than differences in market performance.  
6 Adam (2007) also reports an experiment in a sticky price environment.  However, the focus of his study is on 
expectation formation, and he does not examine directly the effects of price frictions.  Fehr and Tyran (2001, 2008) 
discussed below, use laboratory methods to examine adaptive expectations and psychological factors such as money 
illusion as drivers of slow responses to an announced nominal shock.  4 
 
suggesting that something other than price or information frictions drives adjustment delays in 
our markets. 
Further experimentation indicates that two factors largely explain the unexpectedly slow 
adjustment process.  First, a private announcement of the shock to all sellers (rather than a public 
announcement)  allows  some  participants  to  initially  miss  the  announcement  and  for  several 
periods  tempers  an  updating  of  expectations  and  prices  as  sellers  do  not  share  common 
knowledge  of  the  shock.    Second,  many  sellers  fail  to  best  respond  to  their  expectations.  
Combining a public announcement of the shock and a requirement that sellers best respond to 
their  price  forecasts  causes  markets  to  respond  almost  instantaneously  and  completely  to  a 
nominal shock. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 addresses theoretical 
considerations and develops pertinent behavioral conjectures. Section 3 reviews the experiment 
design and procedures.  Results appear in sections 4.  Section 5 present results of additional 
treatments.  The paper concludes with a short sixth section. 
 
2. Nominal Shocks in Monopolistically Competitive Economies with Rigidities 
We  implement  a  variant  of  the  monopolistically  competitive  market  structure  that 
predominates in the theoretical discussion regarding effects of nominal disturbances (Blanchard 
and Kiyotaki, 1987, Romer, 2001, Woodford, 2003).   Consider a market with nfirms. Each firm 
i  offers a differentiated product at a price of  i P  with a common real unit cost, C.  DefiningM as 
a nominal scale variable we link nominal real prices and unit costs in the usual way, e. g., c=C/M 
and pi = Pi/M. We posit a linear demand for good i  
 
p p q i i       ,  (1) 
where  0   and  0    .
7   Given the demand function, a firm maximizes its profit 
  () () , i i i i p c q p p   . 
First order conditions yield the optimal price response in terms of the overall price level and cost. 
p c p
mc
i       2 /                  (2) 
                                                 
7 Similar to the demand equation in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), quantity demanded moves inversely with own 
price but directly with the average price level. We simplify the Blanchard and Kiyotaki  analysis slightly by 
specifying a linear demand function.  Consumers‟ demand is linear when they have quadratic utility over the 
differentiated products; see, e.g., Vives (1999). A number of differentiated product experiments use linear demand, 












 .  Invoking symmetry and solving (2) for p
mc yields










                  (3) 
Monopolistically  competitive  predictions  have  the  convenient  feature  that  strategic 
considerations  do  not  affect  optimal  seller  price  choices,  an  assumption  that  facilitates  the 
analysis of dynamic price adjustment paths.  For this reason we are interested in approximating 
monopolistically  competitive  conditions  in  our  laboratory  implementation,  a  condition  we 
facilitate by having sellers base price choices on own and the overall average price, as described 
below.  The organizing power of monopolistically competitive outcomes represents our first 
conjecture. 
Conjecture 1: Prices converge to the monopolistically competitive predictions. 
Although  monopolistically  competitive  predictions  represent  a  desirable  baseline 
condition, given the limited number of sellers in our markets, we recognize that sellers may not 
view their pricing decisions as having no impact on the overall average market price.  For this 
reason we also present Nash predictions as a reference, and we assess market outcomes largely in 
terms of their convergence to a price range bound by the monopolistically competitive and Nash 
predictions.  Fortunately,  given  the  size  of  our  markets  (n=6),  Nash  and  monopolistically 
competitive outcomes are quite close.
8  The emergence of Nash  rather than monopolistically 
competitive  predictions does not damage  seriously  our behavioral analysis  (although it does 
potentially complicate analysis of the dynamic adjustment path).   
To  help  assess  the  organizing  power  of  the  monopolistically   competitive/Nash 
predictions,  we  dev elop  two  additional  reference  outcomes.    First,  despite  product 
differentiation, sellers may  myopically undercut the prices of all rivals .   In this case, market 
prices would collapse on the „Walrasian‟ level, p
w=c.   Second, sellers may collude.  The joint 
profit maximizing price for the whole industry 








represents a natural upper limit to collusive prices.  We examine prices generated in our markets 
in light of these alternative predictions. 
                                                 
8 Online Appendix A develops symmetric Nash equilibrium predictions as well as the relationship between Nash 
and monopolistically competitive predictions. 6 
 
 
2.1 Price Rigidities  
We implement a „sticky price‟ model, by allowing only one-third of the firms in a market 
to adjust prices each period.  Firms take turns setting prices. When a firm of type i is selected to 














     ,              (4) 
where Et is the conditional expectation operator given information in period t.  The staggered 
price adjustments of each firm type creates a vector of cotemporaneous prices based on the 
current period price adjustment, an adjustment from the previous period, and an adjustment two 





sp sp sp sp
t t t t p x x x    .                            (5) 
Equations (2), (4), and (5) together imply that the current price level is a linear function of past 
price levels, marginal costs, and expected future price levels. 
We adjust prices for sales because low pricing sellers account for a disproportionate sales 
volume. To find the (quantity weighted) mean transaction price, we generate sales quantities by 
sequentially  inserting  { 12 ,,
sp sp sp
t t t x x x  }  along  with 
sp
t p   into  the  demand  function  (1)  and  then 
weighting price choices by relative sales. 
 
2.2 Information Rigidities  
In a „sticky information‟ model all firms may change prices each period.  However, we 
here assume that only one-third of the firms have current information about the state of the 
economy.  Another third of firms have information that is one period old, while the remaining 
firms have information that is two periods old.  A firm that has information that is  j periods old 
sets its price according to 
  ,
si mc
j t t j t Ep x   .  (6) 
Thus, the average posted price in the economy becomes 
 
12
1 1 1 1 1 1
3 2 3 2 3 2
si si si si
t mc t t t mc t t t mc t t p c p E c p E c p       
                    
     
.   (7) 7 
 
Equation (7) is a variant of the price level equation in Mankiw and Reis (2002): the price level 
depends on the past expectations of the price level and the past expectations of marginal costs. 
As  in  the  sticky  price  model,  the  mean  transaction  price  is  derived  by  sequentially 
inserting elements of the cotemporaneous price vector into the demand function (1) to generate 
individual and collective sales quantities, and then weighting price choices by relative sales. 
 
2.3 Response of Prices to a Nominal Shock  
Absent rigidities, prices adjust immediately to the change in a nominal scale variable: 
costs and demand shift proportionally with the change in Mt increasing the nominal optimal price
mc
i P and unit costs, C, without affecting optimal quantity q
mc.   Either price or informational 
frictions slow the adjustment process. 
To see the magnitude of the adjustment lags caused by price and informational frictions, 
consider the response of price to a one time permanent doubling of the nominal scale variable Mt.  
Figure 1 illustrates the price level adjustment under flexible conditions as well as under price and 
information rigidities using the parameters of our experimental design.
9  In a perfectly flexible 
BASE model, nominal prices rise immediately to a new equilibrium level. Price frictions („SP‟) 
and  information  frictions  („SI‟)  delay  the  adjustment  process  by  two  to  three  periods.    We 
summarize the theoretical predictions about price response to a nominal shock in the form of a 
second conjecture: 
Conjecture 2:  Following a nominal shock the price level rises immediately to a new equilibrium 
level in a flexible economy.  Both information and price frictions slow the adjustment process to 
a nominal shock by two to three periods. 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
We observe that the predicted effects of price and information frictions here are quite 
similar.
10  Our relatively simple design provides  initial insights necessary for more involved 
investigation.  It also generates distinct predictions regarding the effects of sticky prices and 
sticky information relative to a perfectly flexible BASE condition.  Finally, despite the absence of 
                                                 
9 Detailed solutions can be found in online Appendix B. 
10 As a general matter, in a sticky price economy the largest adjustment occurs immediately after the shock, while in 
a sticky information economy more of the adjustment occurs several periods after the shock.  These effects, only 
marginally visible in Figure 1, can be made more distinctive by reducing the number of sellers who can adjust prices 
each period.  Still larger differences can be induced by using a probabilistic updating rule. Our concern that such 
lengthy adjustment delays might undermine market convergence altogether deterred us from inducing longer 
adjustment delays in our design.  8 
 
predicted differences between the SP and SI treatments, we have good reasons to suspect that 
sellers  might  behaviorally  react  differently  to  the  two  sorts  of  frictions.
    In  particular,  we 
anticipate  a  comparatively  slower  adjustment  in  the  SI  treatment.    The  sharp  information 
restrictions in the SI treatment may critically impede learning about the effects of own price 
changes as well as the market adjustment process in general. 
 
3. Experiment Design and Procedures 
3.1. Experiment Design  
To evaluate conjectures 1 and 2 we conduct an experiment consisting of 24 markets.  In 
each market a set of six sellers make pricing decisions in a symmetric differentiated product 
environment.   Markets consist of a series of 80 trading periods.  At the outset of each period 
sellers are endowed with symmetrically differentiated products identified by equation (1), with 
=9.23, = 2.538, = 2.308.  Sellers simultaneously make price decisions under the condition 
that unit production costs are borne only for units that subsequently sell.  Once pricing decisions 
are complete, the average posted price is displayed publicly and an automated buyer program 
makes  purchases  in  accordance  with  the  demand  condition.    Initially  the  nominal  unit  cost, 
C=$10 and the scale factor M=1, making P
W =$10, P
MC= $12.50, P
NE = $12.90 and P
JPM = 
$25.00. 
After 30 periods of stable market conditions, we implement a one-time nominal shock 
between periods 31 and 50, by permanently increasingM from 1 to 2.  Sellers were told that the 
shock would occur at some point in this interval, but they were not told in advance in which 
period the shock would take place.  In fact, the shock period was varied across treatments but 
appeared in periods 35-39, inclusive. The shock is announced on sellers‟ screens at the beginning 




$25.80  and P
JPM’ = $50.00. 
The  24  markets  are  divided  into  three  8-market  treatments.  A  baseline  („BASE’) 
treatment, implements a perfectly flexible economy. Every period sellers both set prices and see 
market results (the average price and own profits) at the period‟s end.  In a second, sticky price 
(‘SP’) treatment, only two out of the six sellers may adjust prices each period.   The sellers take 
turns, with each seller updating prices every third period. In the third, sticky information („SI’) 
treatment, only two firms see market results from the immediately preceding period. Two other 9 
 
firms see market results that are one period old, while the remaining two firms see market results 
that are two periods old.  Again, sellers take turns. Each seller sees results of the immediately 
preceding period every third period. 
 
3.2. Procedures 
 Data were collected in a series of 12-participant sessions.  At the outset of each session a 
monitor  seats  participants  randomly  at  visually  isolated  computers  to  form  two  six-seller 
markets.  The monitor then reads aloud instructions as the participants follow along on printed 
copies of their own. To facilitate understanding, screen displays are also projected to the front of 
the room as the monitor reads instructions. Instructions explain price-posting procedures and the 
consequences  of  both  a  positive  and  a  negative  shock.    Participants  are  given  as  common 
knowledge full information regarding aggregate supply and demand conditions as well as the 
terminal period. Sellers have profit calculators that compute their earnings for any choice of their 
own price and the expected average market price.  Prior to beginning subjects answer a quiz 
about price posting procedures and earnings, and a monitor discusses publicly the correct answer 
to each question.  Finally, to better acquaint subjects with the incidence and indicators of a 
shock, we administer a pair of 5-period practice sessions for which subjects are not paid.  In the 
first practice session we implement a positive nominal shock in period 5, in the second practice 
session we implement a negative nominal shock in period 5. 
To facilitate the decision-making process and the interpretation of results, we supplement 
the numerical display of pricing decisions and earnings with bar graphs.  Also, in an effort to 
identify expectations, we ask sellers to predict the average market price each period.  If a seller‟s 
forecast lies within 50¢ of the subsequently observed average price, the seller earns a forecast 
prize of 2 lab dollars.  Otherwise the forecast prize is zero.  Earnings from the forecasting game 
supplement period earnings from sales.
11 
At the end of the  experiment participants are paid privately the sum of their earnings, 
converted to U.S. currency at a rate of $100 lab = $1 U.S. before the nominal shock and at a rate 
of $200 lab = $1 U.S. after the nominal shock plus a $6 appearance fee, and were dismissed one 
at a time. 
                                                 
11 Our forecasting game emulates the expectations elicitation techniques used in some early asset market 
experiments (e.g., Williams, 1987 and Smith et al., 1988).  As in these earlier experiments, we intentionally kept the 
compensation rate for an accurate forecast low, in order to deter participants from altering their pricing decisions in 
order to secure the forecast prize.  10 
 
In total 144 volunteers participated in the experiment (48 in each treatment).  Participants 
were volunteers recruited from upper level undergraduate business and engineering classes at 
Virginia Commonwealth University in the spring semester of 2009.  No one participated in more 
than one session.  Earnings for the 80-100 minute sessions ranged from $15 to $32 and averaged 
about $23 (inclusive of the appearance fee). 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Market Convergence  
The charting of mean transaction prices for the eight markets in each treatment, shown as 
Figure 2, provides an overview of market performance. In the figure, we standardize market 
outcomes about the period of the shock, which we label as period 35, a convention that makes 
period 76 the last common period. 
*** Figure 2 about here *** 
Several  general  observations  about  market  performance  are  readily  apparent  from 
inspection of the figure.  Observe first that initial market adjustment is quite rapid: in both the 




range. Our initialization of prices at unit costs mechanically slows initial equilibration in the SP 
treatment, but even here markets converged after five periods.
12  Notice second that toward the 
end of the pre- and post- shock sequences mean transaction prices in all treatments ultimately 
converge toward the P
MC P
NE (or, post-shock, the P
MC’ P
NE’) range.  Defining percentage 




JPM’ post-shock) mean 
transaction prices for the last five pre-shock periods are within 5.3% of P
MC and within 2.6% of 
P
NE.      In  the  last  five  post-shock  periods,  mean  transaction  prices  for  all  three  treatments 
similarly fall close to the P
MC’ P
NE’ range, with mean transaction prices within 2.4% of the 
relevant post-shock range from P
MC’ and within 3.07% of P
NE’.  These observed deviations are 
very small relative to deviations from P
W and P
W’(which were no smaller than 16.3% of the 
relevant pre- or post-shock range) and P
JPM and
 P
JPM  „(which were similarly no smaller than 
                                                 
12 The relatively slow initial adjustment for the SP markets provides some precedent for much longer adjustment 
observed following the period 35 shock.   11 
 
78.1%  of  the  relevant  ranges).
13    The tendency of mar kets to converge closely toward  the 
monopolistically competitive/ Nash predictions range in each treatment represents a first finding. 
Finding 1: Pre-shock, convergence toward the P
MCP
NE range is both rapid and reasonably 
complete.  Post-shock, prices ultimately converge to the P
MC’ P
NE’  range. 
This  result  parallels  findings  regarding  convergence  to  static  Nash  predictions  in  a 
number  of  differentiated  product  oligopoly  experiments  (e.g.,  Garcia-Gallego,  1998,  Huck, 
Normann, and Oechssler, 2000, Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis, 2001, Davis 2002 and Davis 
and Wilson, 2005).  Nevertheless, Finding 1 is a useful calibration result, for two reasons. First, 
to the best of our knowledge, no one has previously examined convergence properties of markets 
with price or information frictions. Second and perhaps more importantly, tacit collusion does 
not importantly affect outcomes.
14  The absence of tacit collusion as an important driver of 
behavior in our markets enhances the appeal of our design for a laboratory examination of price 
adjustment processes in monopolistically competitive markets. 
 
4.2. Response of Prices to the Nominal Shock  
Our primary interest, however, is in the response to the nominal shock. As indicated by 
the heterogeneous and generally slow upward drift of the transaction price paths, adjustment was 
neither uniform nor nearly as rapid as predicted.  Consider first across-treatment differences in 
the price adjustment process, the subject of conjecture 2.  Table 1 reports differences in mean 
transaction prices between treatment pairs for the 12 periods following the shock.
15  Looking 
first at the comparisons for periods 35 to 37 shown at the top of the Table observe that 
immediately following the shock mean transaction prices in the  SP and SI treatments are much 
lower than in the BASE treatment.  The BASE- SP difference, in column (1) grows from $1.68 in 
period 35 to $5.46 in period 36 prior to falling to $2.04 in period 37.  The period 36 comparison 
                                                 
13  Table C1 in online Appendix C provides a more complete assessment of convergence tendencies in the final 
periods pre- and post-shock.   
14 We do observe that in several markets some sellers attempted to raise prices by posting price „spikes‟, or very 
large single-period price increases. In the pre-shock phase posting a price at the upper bound of $50 would result in 
sales of zero units, but would raise the average posted price over the monopolistically competitive prediction by 
$6.25, which in turn might prompt sellers to raise their prices in future periods.  As suggested by the generally 
competitive prices in the pre-shock periods, the effects of such efforts were minor at best. Given the relatively large 
size of the market and the disproportionate sales volume going to the low-pricing sellers each period, the incapacity 
of such attempts at signaling is unsurprising. Sellers largely terminated such signaling efforts in the post-shock 
environment.  We observe that the capacity of sellers to signal by posting irrelevantly high prices is a peculiarity of 
our design that is without parallel in naturally occurring contexts.  In future experiments along these lines we plan to 
eliminate the effects of such price postings by reporting only the average of price postings that resulted in sales.  
15 The first 12 post-shock periods include all treatment differences significant at p<.10.  12 
 
is significant at p<.05 using a Mann-Whitney test.  Initial post-shock differences between the 
BASE and SI treatments, summarized in column (2) are very similar: the BASE-SI difference of 
$1.68 in period 35 grows to $5.44 in period 36 prior to shrinking somewhat to $2.71 in period 
37.  The period 35 and 37 BASE-SI differences are significant at p<.10, while the period 36 
comparison is significant at p<.05.  These differences are as predicted. 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
Following period 37 however, the BASE-SP and BASE-SI series diverge.  The BASE-SP 
difference falls to 27¢ in period 38, and remains less than 60¢ in all subsequent periods 39-46 
except one (a 78¢ difference in period 40).  None of these differences are significant at p<.10.  In 
contrast, the BASE–SI difference is $1.41 in period 38 and differences in the eight subsequent 
periods 39-46 all exceed $1.25.  These differences are significant at p<.05 in three instances 
(periods 40, 43 and 44) and at p<.10 in two other instance (periods 45 and 46). 
The SP – SI comparisons in column (3) provide some evidence that „sticky information‟ 
also slows adjustment relative to a comparable „sticky price‟ friction.   Initial post-shock SP –SI 
differences of 0,  -1¢ and 68¢ in periods 35, 36 and 37 suggest that sticky price and sticky 
information elicit similar effects immediately following the shock.  However, in period 38 the SP 
–SI  difference  increases  to  $1.14  and  remains  $1.00  or  more  for  periods  39-44.    Outcome 
variability renders these differences less persistently significant: differences are significant at 
p<0.10 twice (in periods 39 and 44) and at p<.05 only once (in period 43).  Nevertheless, these 
results  at  least  tentatively  indicate  that  as  a  behavioral  matter  „sticky  information‟  not  only 
retards convergence relative to a frictionless baseline by a more than predicted  amount, but it 
also retards market adjustment more than a comparable „sticky price‟ friction.  Findings 2(a) and 
2(b) summarize our comparison of prices across treatments. 
Finding 2(a):  Consistent with predictions, deviations in both the SP and SI treatments exceed 
those in the BASE treatment in the periods immediately following the shock. 
Finding 2(b): Prices in the SI treatment adjust more slowly than in the BASE and SP treatments. 
 
4.3. Predicted versus Observed Responses to the Nominal Shock   
Our most prominent finding, however, is that markets in all treatments respond to the 
nominal shock far more slowly than predicted.  The deviations from the predicted adjustment 13 
 
paths  for  periods  35-55  of  the  BASE,  SP  and  SI  treatments  shown  in  Table  2  document 
quantitatively the differences between predicted and observed responses to the nominal shock.
16 
*** Table 2 about here *** 
Looking over deviations for the  BASE, SP and SI treatments, notice that other than the 
small deviations from the predicted adjustment path in the immediate post-shock periods of SP 
and  SI  treatments  (where  the  price  and  information  frictions  generate  predicted  delays),  the 
adjustment patterns in the three treatments are far more similar than different.  Following period 
37, deviations in all treatments uniformly differ significantly from zero at p<.05 at least until 
period 44, and exceed $1.50 (5% of the P
W’ to P
JPM’ range) at least until period 43.  The observed 
lags exceed the predicted effects of price and information frictions, which are at most two to 
three  periods.
17  Finding  3  summarizes  our  comparison  of  post -shock  prices  to  the 
monopolistically competitive predictions. 
Finding 3:  In all three treatments,  prices adjust to a nominal shock far more slowly than 
predicted by the monopolistically competitive models with fully rational sellers. 
Although other investigators have also observed adjustment lags after nominal shocks in 
laboratory price setting games, the adjustment delays, particularly in response to an announced 
positive shock (rather than a negative shock) have been much less pronounced.   Most pertinent 
is Fehr and Tyran (2001), who report an experiment in a price setting context where action 
choices are strategic complements. These authors find an adjustment lag of some eight periods to 
a negative nominal shock.  However, in response to an announced positive shock, the markets 
adjusted quite quickly, within three periods.
18 
 
5. Public Information, Non-Best Responses and Delayed Price Adjustments 
                                                 
16 The listed periods 35-55 include all deviations significant at p<.10. 
17 The re-emergence of significant deviations in periods 49-55 of the BASE treatment after falling below 75¢ in 
periods 46-48 is reminiscent of the long adjustment swings observed in markets where actions are strategic 
complements observed e.g., by Heemeijer et al. (2009).  The absence of similar cycles in the SP and SI treatments 
lead us to speculate that while price and information frictions impede the adjustment process, sellers‟ incapacity to 
respond immediately to their rivals may perhaps help somewhat with market stability. At this point, however, we 
emphasize that this conjecture is purely speculative.  
18 Fehr and Tyran attribute the differential market responses to positive and negative shocks to the asymmetrical 
effects of money illusion:  in the case of negative nominal shock sellers must overcome a psychological desire to 
maintain high nominal prices, which retards adjustment.  In contrast, the case of a positive nominal shock, money 
illusions does not impede the response to a positive shock, since it allows sellers to make psychologically appealing 
rapid nominal price increases. 14 
 
We turn our attention now to possible reasons for the generically slower-than-predicted 
responses to the nominal shock in our markets.  For this discussion, we focus on BASE treatment 
outcomes, since analysis of the adjustment lag in these markets requires no adjustment for either 
information  or  price  frictions.    Inspection  of  BASE  treatment  results  suggests  two  possible 
sources of adjustment delay.  First, we announced the shock privately to all sellers rather than 
publicly, raising the possibility that some sellers may have simply missed the announcement.
19  
Many sellers did in fact appear to miss the initial announcement.  In the eight  BASE markets, 22 
of the 48 sellers missed the shock in the sense that they posted a price below the new $20 unit 
cost in the period of the shock.  Although all sellers quite quickly appreciated that the shock had 
occurred, it may be the case that the initial failure of some sellers to notice the shock caused 
sellers to adjust downward their expectations thus lowering their own prices and delaying the 
adjustment.
20 
Second, we observe a marked propensity for sellers to deviate substantially from  best 
responding to their forecasts.   Rather, many sellers exhibited a pronounced tendency to set a 
price close to their forecasts of the future average price. For example, in the first five post-shock 
periods of the BASE markets, 69% of seller pricing decisions were within $1.50 of their forecast 
of the average price, compared to only 41% of decisions within $1.50 of the best response to that 
forecast.  More generally, in those five post shock periods 71% of price decisions were closer to 
forecasts than to best responses.
21  A tendency to  imitate expectations in this way  can delay 
adjustment to a positive shock because when prices are below the equilibrium, the best response 
to an expected price increase is an even higher price.
22 
                                                 
19 Such an announcement would have made it impossible to introduce information frictions in our SI environment. 
To allow comparability across treatments, we announced privately the shock on each participant‟s computer screen 
in all treatments 
20  In period 36 only six sellers priced below unit costs, and only four of those really „missed‟  the shock (one seller 
lowered price below cost in response to a low price by a rival, and another posted a price of $19).  By period 37 only 
two sellers clearly acted in ignorance of the shock.  
21 Figure C1 in an online Appendix C illustrates more completely seller forecasts and their pricing decisions in the 
first five post-shock periods. 
22 This tendency for sellers to imitate their expectation of the average choice rather than to best respond to that 
expectation has often been observed in laboratory oligopolies.  For example, Huck, Norman and Oechssler (2002) 
conclude that the tendency for sellers to engage in „imitative‟ behavior explains the behavioral stability of Cournot 
markets that are unstable to a best response dynamic.  We find it interesting that in the present case, where choices 
are strategic complements rather than strategic substitutes, this same tendency retards convergence. Also interesting 
is that the tendency for sellers to imitate rather than best respond to forecasts should speed the response to 
downward shocks.  In a market environment very different from the one examined here Davis and Korenok (2009) 
find some evidence of this „balloons and bricks‟ response to respective positive and negative  shocks.  15 
 
These  results  suggest  two  additional  treatments.    First,  to  examine  the  effects  of 
providing  only  private  information  about  the  shock,  we  conduct  a  „PUB’  treatment,  which 
replicates procedures for the BASE treatment in all respects except that the incidence of the 
shock is publicly announced.  Prior to the shock we a monitor pauses the session and says aloud 
that the shock is about to occur. Second, to examine the effects of sellers‟ failure to best respond 
to their expectations, we conduct a PUB/BR treatment which is identical to the PUB treatment, 
except that sellers submit only forecasts rather than prices.
23  Prices are calculated as the best 
responses to those forecasts. We conjecture that one or both of these treatments will speed the 
post-shock adjustment process. 
As in the previous treatments, we conducted a series of eight six-seller markets. Other 
procedures were also similar: participants were drawn from the same subject pool as in the initial 
sessions,  no  one  participated  in  more  than  one  session  and  no  one  who  had  previously 
participated in an initial session participated again here.
24  Sessions were conducted at Virginia 
Commonwealth University in the Spring Semester of 2011.   Earnings, for the 96 participants in 
the  new  sessions  ranged  from  $1 5.75  to  $35.25  and  averaged  $21. 50  (inclusive  of  a  $6 
appearance fee). 
Figure 3 (formatted as Figure 2) illustrates mean transaction prices paths in the PUB and 
PUB/BR treatments.  For reference, the figure illustrates BASE treatment results as well.  A first 
result evident from the figure is that the public announcement of the shock considerably speeds 
the initial adjustment to the shock observed in the BASE treatment: mean transaction prices for 
both the PUB and PUB/BR treatments jumped toward the P
MC’ prediction immediately following 
the shock, leading us to conclude that to a large degree the very sizable deviations observed in 
initial periods following the shock are attributable to a failure of many sellers to initially notice 
the shock. 
*** Figure 3 about here *** 
                                                 
23 We thank a referee for suggesting this treatment.  A number of investigators have solicited forecasts and then 
computed prices for sellers as best responses (see, e.g,. Adam, 2007, Heemeijer et al., 2009 and Marimon et al., 
1993).   
24 Two minor differences distinguish procedures in these additional sessions from those used in the initial sessions. 
First, some of the sessions in these latter two treatments involved three rather than two simultaneous markets.  
Second, all eight PUB/BR markets and three of the eight PUB markets used Z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) 
rather than the custom program used for the original sessions.  Instructions and the screen interface for participants, 
however, did not change and this alteration in the underlying program was invisible to participants.  16 
 
A second result regards the final adjustment of markets toward the P
MC  P
NE range post-
shock.  Notice that despite nearly identical responses for the PUB and PUB/BR treatments in the 
first two post-shock periods, adjustment paths differ thereafter.  In the PUB treatment prices 
begin to drift slowly downward, where they remain until they intersect the adjustment path for 
the BASE treatment in period 45.  Thereafter PUB and BASE treatments move together, evolving 
very slowly toward the P
MC’ prediction, roughly by period 60. In the PUB/BR treatment, by way 
of contrast, transaction prices quickly lock onto the P
MC’ prediction and remain there throughout 
the remainder of the session.   
Table 3, which lists the deviations of mean transaction prices from P
MC’ for the PUB and 
PUB/BR treatments for period 35 and the first 20 periods post-shock provides more complete 
insight into this adjustment process.   Examining deviations  for the  PUB treatment, listed  in 
column (2) of the table, observe that deviations for the first post-shock periods are much smaller 
than for the BASE treatment, shown in column (1).  In fact, following period 35 the deviation 
from P
MC’ did not significantly exceed zero for three periods (periods 36, 37 and 38). After 
period 38, however, deviations in the PUB treatment begin to increase and remain fairly large for 
the remainder of the periods summarized in the table.  For example, in 12 of the 17 periods 39-55 
the deviation exceeded 90¢. These deviations also often differ significantly from zero: over the 
same 17 period sequence, the mean transaction price deviated significantly from P
MC’ at p<.05 in 
12  instances  and  a  p<.10  in  another  three  instances.  In  contrast  in  the  PUB/BR  treatment, 
deviations for periods 39-55 were uniformly less than 25¢ and differed significantly from zero 
only in periods 54 and 55, when prices  edged up above P
MC’ (into P
MC’ – P
NE’ range). We 
summarize these observations as a fourth finding. 
 Finding 4:  A combination of private (rather than public) information about a shock as well as 
a failure of many sellers to best respond to their expectations drives the theoretically unpredicted 
adjustment lags in our frictionless baseline markets. 
*** Table 3 about here *** 
The  adjustment-improving  effects  of  the  PUB  and  PUB/BR  treatments  have  some 
precedent in the literature.  The publicity of the shock announcement not only eliminates an 
immediate  initial  adjustment  lag  caused  by  some  sellers  missing  the  message,  but  also  the 
associated tempering of expectations regarding price adjustments due to the (revealed) lack of 
common knowledge about the shock.  This is the sort of phenomenon analyzed by Haltiwanger 17 
 
and  Waldman  (1998).
25  Similarly,  the tendency for many sellers to price closer to their 
expectations rather than to the best responses to those expectations is typical of the sort of 
„herding‟ behavior discussed frequently in the behavioral finance literature (See, e.g., Hirshleifer 
and Teoh, 2003). Sellers, uncertain of the appropriate price action, cluster about how they expect 
others to act.  The effects of tempered expectations due to a perceived privacy of information 
about the shock combined with a propensity of sellers to set prices close to the expected average 
actions both contribute to the very slow adjustment process in our markets.  
 
6. Discussion 
This paper reports an experiment conducted to evaluate the role of information and price 
frictions as drivers of real effects resulting from a nominal shock.  We find that both price and 
information frictions impede price adjustment by several periods, as predicted by the standard 
dynamic models of monopolistically competitive markets.  However, and more importantly, we 
observe  much  longer  than  predicted  adjustment  lags  not  only  in  „sticky  price‟  and  „sticky 
information‟ treatments, but in a frictionless baseline environment as well. 
Results  of  two  additional  treatments  explain  the  pervasive  adjustment  delays  in  our 
markets.  In a first treatment we paused the session and announced publicly that the shock was 
about to occur. We find that the public announcement importantly speeds the initial response to 
the shock.  However, the public announcement alone is insufficient to drive markets completely 
to the range of post-shock equilibrium prices.  In a second treatment, in addition to publicly 
announcing the shock, we confined seller choices to their forecasts of the price level.  Prices 
were subsequently determined for each seller as the optimal response to  his or her forecast.  
Here, we find that adjustment to the monopolistically competitive prediction is both complete 
and nearly instantaneous.  Comparison of the post-shock adjustment process in these treatments 
with those in the frictionless baseline treatment suggests that a combination of sellers‟ learning 
                                                 
25 Haltiwanger and Waldman posit that a subset of agents are boundedly rational in the sense that they have 
backward rather than forward looking expectations (similar to the sellers in our markets who initially missed the 
announcement of the shock).  Haltiwanger and Waldman show that when actions are strategic complements, as is 
the case in our price-setting markets, boundedly rational agents slow the adjustment process to a much larger degree 
than would follow from their own failure to adjust prices, because rational agents optimize by mimicking the actions 
of the adaptive players. Fehr and Tyran (2008) report some experimental results that support this theory.  In our 
markets, sellers‟ propensities to imitate rather than best respond to expectations further slows the response to a 
shock.  18 
 
about  the  shock  privately  (rather  than  publicly)  and  a  propensity  for  sellers  to  „imitate‟  the 
expected behavior of rivals very persistently slows the adjustment to a positive shock. 
In closing, we observe that with our experiment, we have not and did not aspire to isolate 
the „true‟ source of frictions that drive real responses to nominal shocks.  However, by injecting 
a controlled and fully identified nominal shock into a laboratory implementation of the market 
structure assumed in the theoretical models, we have hoped to generate observations regarding 
the interactions between underlying economic  institutions and the agents that populate those 
institutions that may either resonate with the perceptions of macroeconomists, or suggest that 
alternative  institutional  settings  or  frictions  may  provide  a  more  appropriate  underlying 
institutional context. 
More specifically, a failure of some agents to appreciate the notification of a change in 
circumstances is, at least to us, certainly plausible (perhaps distressingly so when viewed in light 
of our regular interactions with students). To some extent, this notion is captured by the sticky 
information  model.  The  sticky  information  model,  however,  assumes  that  all  subjects  best 
respond to their circumstances, while our results suggest that a failure to best respond may create 
additional adjustment inertia. Anchoring pricing decisions on the expected average price rather 
than  on  the  best  response  to  that  price,  while  unquestionably  non-optimizing,  does  have  a 
number  of  features  that  can  make  it  a  prominent  behavioral  attractor.    Not  only  does  such 
behavior accord with the intuitive notion of pricing to „meet the competition,‟ but many agents 
may view pricing close to the expected price of rivals as „safe‟ in the sense that it truncates the 
risk associated with erring in one‟s calculations of optimality and being left out of the market. To 
the extent that the behaviors we observe here have parallels in the pertinent natural contexts, the 
real effects of nominal shocks may be both substantial and persistent and may far exceed the 
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Table 1: Post- Shock Price Differences Across Treatments  





BASE – SI 
(3) 
SP – SI 
 
35  1.68  1.68
*  0.00 
36  5.46
**  5.44
**  -0.01 
37  2.04  2.71
*  0.68 
38  0.27  1.41  1.14 
39  0.37  1.69  1.32
* 
40  0.78  2.27
**  1.49 
41  0.57  1.41  0.84 
42  0.19  1.41  1.22 
43  0.22  1.60
**  1.38
** 
44  0.26  1.26
**  1.00
* 
45     0.52  1.31
*  0.78 
46  0.53  1.33
*  0.80 
Notes: Asterisks indicate periods prices differ significantly across compare treatments using a Mann-
Whitney test *p< 10%, **p< 05%  (two tailed tests).   
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46  -0.75  -1.28
**  -2.08
** 
47  -0.63  -1.22
**  -1.40
** 
48  -0.67  -0.97
*  -1.12 
49  -1.73
**  -0.81  -0.87 
50  -1.03
*  -0.80  -1.22
* 
51  -0.94
**  -0.68  -0.86 
52  -0.90
**  -0.65  -0.78 
53  -0.86
*  -0.39  -0.70 
54  -0.71
*  -0.28  -0.62 
55  -0.62  -0.18  -0.72 




i o P P H  : { , , } i B SP SI  , ** p<.05,  * p<.10 (two tailed Wilcoxon 
tests).  Bolded entries highlight periods where the deviation exceeds 5% of the P
W to P
JPM range.   
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B P P   
(2) 
MC T
PUB P P   
(3) 
MC T






**  -0.47  -0.39 
37  -3.72
**  -0.69  -0.15 
38  -3.44
**  -0.72  -0.11 
39  -3.31
**  -1.02
**  -0.20 
40  -2.43
**  -0.97
**  -0.16 
41  -2.22
**  -0.92
**  -0.21 
42  -1.84
**  -0.97
*  -0.18 
43  -1.56
**  -0.68  -0.14 
44  -1.26
**  -0.73  -0.18 
45  -0.91
*  -0.81
**  -0.17 
46  -0.75  -1.02
**  -0.16 
47  -0.63  -1.05
**  -0.06 
48  -0.67  -0.91
**  -0.01 
49  -1.73
**  -1.25
**  -0.23 
50  -1.03
*  -1.06
**  -0.24 
51  -0.94
**  -1.69
*  -0.03 
52  -0.90
**  -0.78
*  0.02 
53  -0.86
*  -0.86





55  -0.62  -1.07
**  0.10
** 
Notes:   Asterisks denote rejection of 
mc T
i o P P H  : } / , , { BR PUB PUB B i  ** p<.05,  * p<.10 (two tailed 
Wilcoxon tests).   
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Figure 1. Predicted transaction price adjustment to a 100% increase in a nominal scale variable 
in a frictionless narket („BASE’), a market with price frictions („SP’) and a market with 
information frictions („SI’). 
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Figure 3. Mean Transaction Prices BASE, PUB and PUB/BR Treatments.  
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